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Introduction: The World of 1992
Daniel Wilkes
THIS VOLUME, A Century of World Law, tackles the beginnings and the end of a hundred-year span that has twenty-five
years yet to go. Its theme is that there is no better way to tell
where international law is going than to look at the road this branch
of the law has already traveled.
Thus, each author has divided
THE AUTHoR (A.B., Princeton Univerhis study of a given area of
sity, LL.B., Harvard University, LLM.,
world law into three periods:
New York University) is presently a Visiting Professor at the Syracuse University
(1) where we were, 1892-1917,
School of law where his teaching specialthe first quarter of this "Centies include InternationalBusiness Transactions, Civil Procedure,JudicialAdmintury"; (2) where we are, 1967;
istration,InternationalOrganizations,Inand (3) where we are going ternational Law, and Comparative Law.
1968-1992 - problems of the
A member of the American Society of
International Law and the Association Inquarter-century yet to run.
temationale de Droit Penal, he has been
This process of "stock-taking"'
admitted to the New York Bar.
is also perhaps the best way
to commemorate a landmark
event, such as the Seventy-Fifth Anniversary of the Western Reserve University School of Law, which this volume celebrates. For
a great law school, too, a landmark year is a stock-taking year, a
time of looking back to see the paths chosen and the milestones already in place, and a time of looking forward to assay the choices
yet to be made, the bridges yet to be built, and the signposts yet to
be erected.
I. THE VERTICAL COMPARATIVE APPROACH
As applied to international law, the process of stock-takingwhich might technically be called vertical comparative law - is
perhaps most valuable for the perspectives it gives about the present state of "world law," that branch of law which concerns the
community aspects of international law in the family of nations
SThis analogy to a corporation's practice of periodically taking inventory of its
stocks of goods and supplies reflects the fact that international law decisions like business ones, will be made most "rationally" with an up-to-date picture of the "business"
as a whole in mind.

2 The term "world law" was introduced into the Anglo-American legal vocabulary
by the late Grenville Clark and by Louis Sohn, now Bemis Professor of International
Law at Harvard Law School, in ClARK & SOHN, WORLD PEACE THROUGH WORLD

LAw (1st ed. 1958) and SoRm, CASES ON WoRLD LAw (1950).
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For example, most misconceptions about the punishment of war
criminals under present-day world law stem from a lack of awareness of the steps already taken to make clear that certain kinds of
military action, including aggressive war, are outlawed and that
their perpetrators are personally liable to punishment. These steps
go back, even before our Century began, to such precedents as: (1)
1815, the decision to place Napoleon on the island of St. Helena
under guard;3 (2) 1856, Declaration of Paris on conduct of warfare at sea;4 and (3) 1861, President Lincoln's "Instructions" on
conduct during the American Civil War of 1861-1865, and American war crimes trials after the war of Union officers for mistreatment of civilians and prisoners.5
The contribution by Robert Bloom, "Steps To Define Offenses
Against the Law of Nations," puts that stream of development into
a perspective which makes clear the naivet6 of those who thought
there was a colorable ex post facto defense at Nuremberg. Mr.
Bloom's vertical analysis of where we are today also makes it dear
why the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations
(ECOSOC) 6 has recently condemned the use of domestic statutes of
limitations to cut off prosecutions for "War Crimes" and "Crimes
Against Humanity" - these world law offenses are deemed adequately defined - and why, on the other hand, Secretary-General
U Thant's 1966 Draft Convention against such limitations did not
expressly tackle "Crimes Against the Peace" - because there are
great difficulties in defining "Aggression" as Mr. Bloom's article
describes.
Again, without vertical study, it is easy to fall into the trap of
believing that "Aggressive War" is not yet unlawful for want of
8 See Bellot, The Detention of Napoleon Buonaparte [sic), 39 L.Q. REv. 170, 17681 (1923). The Prussian proposal for capital punishment was rejected there, as was
a proposal for trial before an international court. It should be noted that intentional
homicide was not itself a capital offense under ancient laws nor in England before the
middle of the twelfth century. DIAMOND, EVOLUTION OF LAW AND ORD1R 280
(1951). Recent use of vertical comparative law has vividly spotlighted the wrong turn.
ings by which states shifted from earlier pecuniary redress to capital punishment for
the wrong done the aggrieved family of the victim. Id. at 88-287.
4 WOMSER, THE LAW 520 (1949).
5 See generally Wilkes, Courts of International Criminal Jurisdiction, in WORLD

PZAcE THROUGH LAw, WASHNGTON CONFmuENC OF 1965 (forthcoming) which
sets forth more fully over seventeen landmarks developing the rule of individual responsibility, including the 1914 British Manual of Military Law, the 1915 Getman
Manual, the German Trial of Captain Fryatt in 1916, and the Leipzig Trials of war
criminals in 1921, including conviction of Lt. Boldt for sinking the hospital ship Lian-

dovery Castle.
6 For a discussion of this organization see note 24 infra.
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an agreed definition of -the "aggression" that is prohibited. Yet,
since 1815 it has been dear that an attempt to take over all of
Europe is unlawful; since 1921, it has been dear that the unwarranted sinking of a hospital ship does not go unpunished;7 and
since 1946 it has been dear that jointly planning and carrying
out
the invasion of a neighboring state with the intention of permanent
occupation of the entire state cannot go unpunished. The long
look backward shows that too many bridges have already been
crossed to say now that the aggression presently prohibited does not
include such acts as these.
The vertical study of the step-by-step development of individual
responsibility for crimes against .the law of nations also helps in
predicting future trends. This can be seen, for example, in Mr.
Bloom's twin theses that (1) by making the individual the subject
of international law for penal responsibility, we will be increasingly
more ready to accord persons the right to claim international legal
protection directly, as has already been done in the complaint procedures of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights;' and (2) the gaps created between the individual's right to
complain of ill-treatment when his mistreator is not yet held liable
to punishment may spell out the next bridges to cross in the area
of defining international offenses.
II. Aims

OF

WORLD LAW,

One other result of this kind of study is to focus on the purposes
world law has been deliberately framed to serve. The contributors
in this study agree that the following are the three main goals of
international law: (1) shaping new forms of agreement and confining disagreement; (2) creating liberty under law; and (3) developing new institutions for cooperation. These aims have remained the same over time. For example, the framers of the
invitations to gather in Panama in 1826, at Versailles in 1919, and
at San Francisco in 1945 already shared a common stated goal that
individual liberty should receive the protections of communal law
through the joint efforts of the states invited to attend.
The emphasis which foreign offices have put on these major
7 See note 5 supra, MuLLINs, THE LEIPZIG TRIALs (1921). Compare the absence
of mention of the Leipzig convictions in attacks on Nuremberg, e.g., voiq KNmumd
THE NuREmBERG TRIALs 395 (1959).
8See generally MUELLER & WISE, INTERNATIONAL CRUMNAL LAW 177-97

(1965); see also the recent United Nations conventions discussed in this study by Professor Edward Wise in "Steps Toward the Advancement of Human Rights."
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purposes, and on varying subordinate goals, has shifted throughout
the Century, and this is reflected in the contributors' studies. Edward Wise's study of "Steps Toward the Advancement of Human
Rights," for example, shows that the current United Nations efforts
to implement human rights had their precursors in nineteenth century humanitarian interventions; yet today they reflect a new "activist" phase, whose 1967 demands for implementing machinery
may have to be given greater priority in the quarter-century ahead.
In a similar way, each of the authors has contributed a building
block toward the world law we will probably have in 1992, using
the trends and new tools he spells out for his own sample within
one of the three broad purposes. In the brief space available, no
author could be comprehensive, either for his subject or for any one
of the three periods, and none has tried to be. A far more extensive look at the year 2000 is under way elsewhere.9 Yet because
each topic is representative of a range of problems in world law, the
result is an imaginative broad-brush picture of what can, will, or
may be done by 1992.
III.

THE WORLD OF

1992

What will this world be like? At least six of the authors see
key changes in their areas that will help in controlling the use of
force in the community of nations.
A.

Nuclear Force

It will be, for example, a world with widespread use of nuclear
power. Stephen Gorove's data shows that world nuclear energy is
expected to increase between now and 1980 by twenty-five fold, or
will be 2500 percent more than in 1967. At the same rate, the
1992 figure will be almost another 2500 percent more than in
1980, or an astounding five million megawatts of electric power.
To cope with quantities like this, engineers have invented the term
"gigawatt" for a thousand megawatts, so that they speak of a capacity for 1992 of "5,000GWe."' Just how much this increase
will mean can be seen in more familiar terms in Table I.
9
A multi-volume series of studies to be called THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNANATIONAL LEGAL ORDER is being edited by Professors Cyril E. Black and Richard A.

Falk under a grant from The Ford Foundation and under the auspices of the Center of
International Studies at Princeton University.
10 For similar estimates, based on 1962 predictions of the United States Atomic
Energy Commission, see Schwoerer & Witzig, Nuclear Power Today and Tomorrow,
1 IEE SPECTRUM 120, 124 fig. 2 (No. 7, 1967). Compare recent estimates of 25 GWe
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TABLE I

Comparison of Projected Nuclear-Produced Electric Capacity for 1992
and Present Capacities of Non-Nuclear Sources' 1
Projected world nuclear
total for 1992
equals
5 million megawatts (MWe)
or
5,000 gigawatts (GWe)
or
any one of the electrical
capacities listed opposite

1,000 x estimated future capacity of
Krasnoyarsk Dam complex (U.S.S..)
1,100 x estimated future capacity of
Churchill Falls Dam (Can.)
2,500 x Grand Coulee Dam (U.S.)
2,900 x estimated Guri Dam (Venezuela)
4,000 x Furnas Dam (Brazil)
or
21 x total United States capacity

48 x total Soviet capacity
150 x total Canadian or French capacity
650 x total Indian capacity
These projections tell us something about the nuclearization of
the world's electric plants, a welcome trend for those concerned
about air pollution from non-nuclear fuels used by most power
plants today. They tell us even more about the qualitative changes
in the world of 1992 which the sheer quantitative changes in electric power will reflect. First, this will be a world in which industrialization will be far more widespread. If a nation like Norway,
with only 3.7 million people, can be the twelfth largest producer of
electrical power today, it is more than likely that every state and
region with at least this many people will be using electric power,
or its successor, in 1992 to light their houses, heat their buildings,
power their manufacturing plants, their computers, and, perhaps,
even provide the power source for their transportation. Second,
merely by retaining the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IABA) inspection system we have today, this will be a world in
which international inspectors will be going into every part of the
globe. Professor Gorove's study points out that we already have
passed six milestones in this area: (1) Access at all times exists for
inspectors to visit any large reactor facility using over sixty kilograms of nuclear fuel a year when placed under the IABA system'
capacity for the six New England states to be supplied by fifteen reactors already planned

for 1990. N.Y. Times, April 3, 1967, p. 47, coL 2.
".Based on the editor's conservative projection.

Current capacity figures are actu-

ally for 1964 computed from figures supplied in NEW YoRK WORLD-TELEGRAM, THE
WORLD ALMANAC 280 (1965); STATIsTIcAL OFFICE OF THE UN1TD NATIONs &
DEP'T OF ECONOMIC AND SocIAL .AFFAIRs, STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1965, at 352-58

(1966).
12

Professor Gorove in "Maintaining Order Through On-Site Inspection: Focus on

the IAEA," describes how this system was adopted by the IAEA Working Group despite the opposition of many states, including the Soviet Union, on political grounds.
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(2) Reactors have been placed under the JAEA by nuclear powers,
such as the United Kingdom and the United States, when not required to do so."8 (3) Inspections under the IAEA system span
four continents, cover fifty-seven reactors, and are carried out by
international civil servants free from national authority. 4 (4) The
nations ready to place reactors under the system have come from
both socialist and non-socialist groups. 5 (5) The IAEA now has
authority to station resident inspectors at a major plant, the Yankee
Power Reactor in the United States.'" (6) The IAEA has developed
effective means of verifying peaceful use of nuclear fuel between
inspections.'
The presence of an international organization such as the IAEA,
with the acceptance of the world law responsibilities and of the
widespread international administration which it will entail in the
1992 world, will have an effect far beyond the limited area now
inspected. It will mean, for example, that a backlog of know-how
Further, he points out that one of the most significant milestones in building controls
for a warless world was the fact that the technical requirements for a foolproof system
were made to prevail over political factors.
18 By 1967, the United States had placed four reactors under IAEA supervision
through agreements entered into with the Agency in 1962 and 1964. By the same year

the United Kingdom had placed its Bradwell Complex under the IAEA, and, in addition, the United States is transferring to the IAEA certain inspection and control functions under its bilateral Atoms for Peace agreements.
14 Countries in which inspections had already taken place by 1967 included Congo
(Kinshasa), Finland, Norway, Pakistan, and the United States. The impartial selection
by the IAEA of inspectors, whether chosen ad hoc from the Secretariat or from countries

allied to or aided by the inspected nation, has been insisted on despite Bulgarian, Polish,
and Soviet opposition, as the inspectors are duty bound not to seek or receive instructions "from any source external to the Agency" - a vital milestone in the development
of world law.
15 Professor Gorove points out that, despite the fact that the Soviet Union has op-

posed IAEA inspection on Soviet territory, in October 1966 Poland and Czechoslovakia
offered to put their civilian reactors under the IAEA if West Germany did the same. It

should also be pointed out that in the 1967 Geneva meetings on a Non-Proliferation
Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union were on the side of those seeking IAEA
inspectors, if inspections were deemed necessary, while certain European states held out
initially for what could conceivably be considered "self-inspection" under Euratom procedures. N.Y. Times, March 1, 1967, p. 9, col. 1; Observer (London), March 5, 1967,
p. 13, col 5.
6

' Again, despite initial rejection of the resident inspector in framing the IAEA's

Statute, this unilateral action of a nuclear power has established a precedent which may
be essential if power plants are developed that cannot use the "tape and seal" device referred to in note 17 infra.
17
This final milestone is the discovery of a "tape and seal" technique to verify that
nuclear fuel rods, capable of producing electricity or heat in a peaceful reactor or nuclear weapons in a non-peaceful one, are not used for military purposes. The tape is
so distinctive that if the rods are removed after the inspectors have sealed them into
place, the tape break will prove, on a subsequent visit, that a secret removal must have
occurred.
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on inspections will mature. 8 It will mean, too, that a backlog of
credibility about peaceful intentions can arise. 9 The success of
existing inspections has already bridged a large credibility gap, for,
as Professor Gorove's study concludes, the IAEA inspections "revealed no diversion and created no insurmountable problems."
It is precisely because of this success that Professor Gorove sees
a further possibility that the staff now developing the expertise in
this area at the IAEA may, by 1992, be monitoring - and, in some
cases, making possible (?) - agreements such as these: (1) a nonproliferation of nuclear weapons treaty; (2) a Latin American nudear free zone agreement; (3) other regional nuclear free zone treaties; or (4) a nuclear disarmament treaty.
It will therefore be not only a world in which the fruits of electric power are growing most widely, but also one in which the inspection techniques needed to spread that growth are used more
broadly. Further, what Professor Gorove has shown for the field
of energy in using the case history of the IAEA represents a host of
world developments in which the peaceful exploitation of technology will require new methods of verification or control, as in the
use of space stations, fish conservation and use of the seabed, nuclear desalination, or weather modification.
B. Armed Force and Confining Conflict
The ability to verify that fissionable uranium is not being used
to stockpile atomic bombs provides one way to keep down the possibilities of nuclear war. It has one vital side effect as well, for it
also keeps down the pressures toward irrational responses that nuclear threats may entail'
The contributor's studies show some equally crucial tools that
will be available in the world of 1992 to limit or avoid the patterns
of the world of 1892-1917, a world which Aaron Danzig describes
so well in "Meeting Demands for Action as a Community of Nations." In this latter period according to Mr. Danzig, "peace-keeping" was a poor investment. The patterns of that earlier world
8
1 Professor Gorove pinpoints three rules of thumb for inspections that have already
emerged: (1) consult with domestic authorities in advance, (2) go with national offidais to the site, and (3) have informal discussions if discrepancies are found.
19
Note the relevance this has for efforts to avoid proliferation of nuclear weapons,

discussed generally in A WORLD OF NUCLEAR POWERS? 140-41 (Buchan ed. 1966).

20 For an excellent discussion of this inter-relationship, see Hoffman, Nuceai Proliferationand World Politics,in A WORLD OF NUCLEAR PowERs? 89-121 (Buchan ed.
1966).
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included, not too infrequently, as Mr. Danzig reminds us, cycles
similar to these:
(1) State X subjectively perceives an insult to it or a violation
of law by State Y.

(2) X demands an adequate apology, reparations, or a halt to the
violation from Y.
Y perceives these demands by X as "unwarranted" under "the
actual facts."
(4) Y considers steps to take, in the light of such "unwarranted"
demands, from a protest of innocence or of counter-violations
by X to a full mobilization. In the course of discussions in
Y, the possibility of bad faith by X is aired, including all
outstanding grievances (also subjectively preceived) which Y
has against X.
(5) Y takes one of the "counter-steps" open to it.
(6) Given X's initial perception, X now perceives, again subjectively, the actions of Y as either:
(a) an increase in insult,
(b) an admission of the facts alleged to be a violation,
(c) a compounding of the violation,
(d) a new threat, or
(e) a demand by Y that X back down to affirm some
overall ascendancy of Y over X.
(7) Finally, it is now more than likely that X will take a step
which repeats the cycle for Y that X has just gone through.
(3)

Indeed, to the extent that this was also a world in which royalty
frequently had a decisive say in foreign affairs, these patterns could
be "played out" between Uncle Bertie (the Prince of Wales) and
his nephew Willie (Kaiser Wilhelm II) with equally fateful consequences." One change since 1917 has been to eliminate this royal
"personal equation" as a factor in world law. No longer, for example, can an heir to the British crown sit down to a wedding feast
with fifty-four royal relations in Berlin at a time when most of
them are more than nominal heads of state."2
The remaining problem has been to prevent these cycles from
remaining unbroken until they lead to acts of war. Here, the pattern itself provides several hints concerning the devices now being
shaped for the world of 1992. The first stage, for example, takes
21

The imagined slights from his English uncle, later to be King of England, may
partially have shaped the role of the German Kaiser in the events which led to World
War . See, e.g., MAGNUs, KING EDWARD THE SEvBNTH 211-13 (1964). The personal connections of European royalty could, and often did, on the other hand, have
cohesive effects as well.
22 Id. at 170. Many of the royal wedding guests at the 1881 wedding of Queen Victoria's grandson, that same "Willie," to Princess Augusta of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Augustenburg went on to the funeral of their assassinated kinsman, Tsar Alexander II of Russia. Ibid. This is another reflection of the hazards of government by
inherited personal power.
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place only if subjective perceptions continue to be made unilaterally
by states. In the case of a treaty which provides for a suspected
violation to be turned over to a third party for less subjective findings of fact, the cycle may be broken right at the start. It is far too
seldom realized just how important such a development is in averting armed conflict, for the emphasis in evaluating fact-finding can
be placed too exclusively on whether the protagonists accept the
findings rather than on whether the process of third-party factfinding has itself stopped a cycle of dash and counter-clash from
reaching ever-heightened levels.
At the second stage, when X formulates its demand, quite significant changes have taken place which foretell a radically different world by 1992. The first of these changes lies in the much
smaller degree of latitude X may now have to formulate its demands unilaterally. Perhaps the most dramatic illustration of this
is at the bilateral level where the arch antagonists of 1870, 1914,
and 1939 - Germany and France - have agreed to mutual consultation on foreign policy.
The second change at the demand stage is the proliferation of
multilateral bodies which can be asked to consider X's charges. before they lead to a definite demand. The dynamic difference in the
world we are structuring here lies in the fact that a nation will be
afforded a new alternative when it perceives itself insulted or its
rights violated - when the strongest of pressures exist for the nation to take some action. This tension, if you will, can be dissipated
by making some demand, but it can also be reduced by taking some
affirmative action such as putting the matter onto someone else's
table. In one case, the dispute remains within the perilous cycle of
the world of 1882-1917, merely waiting for Y's response to spring
taut the tensions once again.
The crux of the difference in the second case for the world of
1992, is that the cycle is broken - again, regardless of whether
the international body more objectively appraises the situation as
one for minimal action or not.
To illustrate the changes so far foreseen, let us suppose that in
March of 1992, a presidential election year in the United States, in
order to meet its radically increased commitments to as many as ten
sets of development banks and loan funds in developing regions2P
23

This figure is based on the projection by Georges Landau of one plausible set of

regions and sub-regions, of which the developing ones are: (1) Africa, North of the
Sahara, (2) Africa, South of the Sahara, (3) Central Asia, (4) South Asia, (5) Southeast

WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

1458

[Vol 18: 1449

the United States imposes a special levy of ten percent on all imports.
In the pre-1917 world, such an act would have been examined
by each nation acting alone, seen as a violation or as a justifiable
emergency measure by each nation alone, and acted upon unilaterally by each alone. This age was one in which diplomats and
international lawyers were, as the contributors point out, torn by
visions of what could be done with a veritable "concert" of Europe
or a Perpetual Union of American States and yet were grated hard
against certain inflexible concepts. The concept of "absolute sovereignty" is perhaps the most familiar. What may not be so familiar is the fact that, far from providing greater freedom of action,
this myth locked diplomats into habits and cycles of interaction
which were, as Michael Barkun points out in "Bringing The Insights of Behavioral Science to International Rules," divorced from
the empirical world. In fact, the major option open under that system was the freedom to remain a prisoner of one's own isolation.
In our hypothetical, for instance, each country's rulers could decide
between a demand for recall of the ten-percent duty, retaliation, or
both. Indeed, it was this kind of world that piled up the tariff barriers between World War I and World War II.
C. The Consequences of New InternationalOrganizations
In 1992, on the other hand, by merely continuing existing organizations, an undoubtedly far too conservative premise, we may
expect to see the protesting countries in our hypothetical bring their
claims and discussions of alternative courses of action to several of
the following bodies:
ECOSOC 24
Secretary-General 26
2
5
GATV7
General Assembly
Asia, (6) Mexico and Central America, (7) Caribbean States, (8) Pacific Andean States,
(9) River Plate Basin States, and (10) Brazil.
24 The Economic

and Social Council of the United Nations is one of its six principal

organs and has twenty-seven members, nine of whom are replaced by election each year.
25 The "parliament of nations," in which matters of world concern may be taken up

for discussion, for recommendation, and, as is not so frequently realized, for reference
of legal questions to the World Court by requests for "advisory opinions," is composed
of 124 members.
26

The Secretary-General, as the person elected by the nations of the world to pre-

side over the international civil staff of the Secretariat, has come to enjoy increasing confidence, especially to provide low-publicity channels of communication, even between
enemies, as is exemplified in the roles of Dag Hammarskjbld in securing the release of
American airmen from Chinese People's Republic prisons and of U Thant in averting

precipitate action during the Cuban missile crisis. The most recent use of this new chan-
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Afro-Asian Blocs0
OAU 31
2
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NATO"o
UNTAB8 4

IBRD 35
Council7 of EuropeO6
WEU

nel to break the bilateral confrontation cycle was in King Hassan II of Morocco's appeal
to U Thant to investigate how to halt the Algerian-Moroccan arms race. N.Y. Times,
March 3, 1967, p. 3, coL 1.
27
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, whose member states agree to extend to all other members any tariff concession negotiated with any GATT member,
was composed of seventy-two members as of April 14, 1967. Its members account for
over eighty percent of world trade. SHiMi,

BAADB & EvEmTr, EUROPEAN REGIONAL

Commuqm.s 213 (1962).
28
The International Monetary Fund guards against nationally fatal currency crises
through, inter alia, gold or hard currency credits and is thus concerned with measures
motivated by a critical imbalance in the flow of gold, as in our hypothetical. Further,
if a trade measure can arguably be characterized as a prohibited exchange control, an
interpretation dispute may arise for referral to the Board of Executive Directors or, on
appeal, to the Board of Governors. The IMP is headquartered in Washington, D.C.
and has 106 members.
29 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, formed to achieve
the highest sustainable economic growth among its members, is headquartered in Pads
and establishes working parties to look into specific disputes among its twenty-three
members.
8
0This is an informal group of states whose delegations currently meet weekly during the months when the General Assembly of the United Nations is in session.
31 The Organization of African Unity has an annual assembly and a Council of Ministers meeting twice a year. The OAU is headquartered at Addis Ababa and is composed of thirty-six members.
82 The Organization of American States is headquartered in Washington, D.C. and
has twenty-three members, the latest to join being Trinidad and Tobago. Cuba is a
member state whose government has been suspended since 1962 from participation in
meetngs. A smaller, but similar, forum exists in the Organization of Central American
States (ODECA) which has headquarters in San Salvador and five members: Costa
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.
38 The North Atlantic Treaty Organiztion has headquarters at Casteau, Belgium,
and fifteen members. It is little known that NATO also sets up working parties on nonmilitary disputes that might threaten cooperation among its members.
8
4 The United Nations Technical Assistance Board, set up by Secretary-General Dag
Hammarskj6ld to coordinate United Nations assistance programs, is composed of the
Secretary-General plus the heads of all the inter-governmental agencies, such as the Food
and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD), the International Monetary Fund (IMP), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), and the head
of the new combined Development Fund.
85
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, usually called "the
World Bank," plays a large role in major aid and development projects and even in
mediating disputes, such as the Indus Waters dispute between Pakistan and India. The
IBRD is headquartered in Washington, D.C., and has 106 members.
86 The Council has headquarters in Strasbourg and is composed of eighteen members. Delegates to its annual Consultative Assembly meeting vote as individuals and
not as government representatives.
87 The Western European Union includes the Common Market Six, see note 41
infra, plus the United Kingdom, and has met quarterly since 1963 at its headquarters
in London.
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EEC 41 4
LAFTA 2
Commonwealth Conference4 3

When those states expecting to be harmed by the new tenpercent duty bring their claims to an international organization in
1992 they will be acting in a world vastly removed from that of
1892 in several ways. First, the confrontation cycle will be broken
at the earliest stage. Second, the tension of perceived threat will
be partially dissipated by the act of each state laying its claim on
some collective table. Third, in Professor Barkun's terms, through
the continuing interest each country has in the benefits it gains from
a particular organization, it develops "a vested interest - both material and emotional - in a minimal level of international amity,"
thus leading it still further away from resolutions based on armed
force. Fourth, as Professor Barkun perceptively points out, there
can be solutions reached by an international organization in terms
of the International Law1 of one group of nations that might not
be obtainable under some broader International Law2."
38 The Council has no headquarters, although it has secretariats in each capital of
its five member states, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. Within the
five-country area, passport requirements for Nordic Council citizens have already been
abolished, traffic rules are being unified, social security is obtainable reciprocally, and
joint research and other cooperation is proceeding at an accelerated pace.
3
9The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance is headquartered in Moscow. Its
eight members include Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolian People's Republic, Poland, Rumania, and the Soviet Union.
40 The European Free Trade Association, sometimes called "the Outer Seven" has
headquarters at Geneva, and seven members plus one associate: Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, plus Finland. The significant difference between action taken by the "Seven" and by the "Bight" is that, if
Finland will not be affected by a decision, the question is brought up in the EFTA
Council, whereas if Finland will be affected, it is brought up in the "Joint" or "FinnEFTA" Council.
41The European Economic Community, often called "the Common Market" or
"the Six" has most of its administrative headquarters in Brussels; however, a few, plus
the Court of Justice of the Communities, are in Strasbourg. The six members, Belgium,
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, are
joined by twenty associate members and thirteen associated overseas territories.
42 The Latin American Free Trade Association is headquartered in Montevideo
and has nine members: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay,
Peru, and Uruguay. This is representative of several regional economic organizations
currently taking on new responsibilities. In Asia, for example, our hypothetical dispute might now appropriately be discussed in the new Asian Development Bank, the
Asian and Pacific Council at its ministerial meeting, or the Association of Southeast
Asia (Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand).
43 The Commonwealth Conference has no official headquarters, but there has been
a Commonwealth Secretariat at Marlborough House in London since 1965; as of November 29, 1966, with the entrance of Barbados, there were thirty-seven members. See
N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1966, § 20, p. 19, col. 1.
44 The idea of using "cow" plus "cow," instead of "a cow" or "two cows" for a
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D. The Consequences of Regionalism and PluralValues
This pluralism is already with us. In several of the international organizations listed for our 1992 hypothetical, the question
of an actual ten-percent surcharge to be laid upon imports by the
United Kingdom in a balance-of-payments emergency was in fact
raised in 1966. London was bound by its GATT treaty obligations45 not to raise listed duties; furthermore by actions taken communally under the convention establishing the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA),4" the state was even treaty-bound -to reduce
dudes on many goods from the other states of the "Outer Seven."47
If the unusual emergency measure to be taken were scrutinized by
each party to these two treaties strictly from the point of view of
whether it would violate their express terms - the traditional pattern of analysis under the old single body of rules International
Law 917 - violations would have been found by at least some states,
and many cycles of confrontation would have started.
In fact, what arose among the GATT and EFTA states was an
ad hoc international rule defining the conditions under which the
United Kingdom's action would not be a violation. As Professor
Barkun points out, the new pattern of analysis is now an information-seeking process which aims to uncover the less abstract, and
hence more rational, specific views of fellow governments in the
same regional, treaty, or charter community. In the 1966 case, the
commonly held views of the GATT-EFTA states, International
Law GATr-ETA, were quickly disclosed, and the United Kingdom
was permitted to keep the ten-percent surcharge until November of
1966!' The key to this non-cycle result was that the proliferation
of organizations by 1966 had already provided many forums, such
as the meetings of the EFTA and Finn-EFTA Councils, " in which
a common approach or rule could be advanced.
more precise use of language is that of Professor Korzybski.

See Korzybski, Extension-

alization in Mathematics, Mathematical Physics, and General Educational,in GMENRAL
SEMANTICS 31 (Baugh ed. 1940).

Its use here to describe different international laws

is the editor's way of presenting Professor Barkun's notion that norms or rules may exist
for the community at large, as in the rules of diplomacy, or merely for regional or other
groups throughout which they are held in common.
45
See
4

note 27 supra.
6 See note 40 supra.

47
Compare the "quantitative restrictions" which could have been introduced under
Article 19 of the Convention establishing the European Free Trade Association to safe-

guard the United Kingdom's balance of payments. See generally BUILDING EFTA 89
(1966). For a discussion of the "Outer Seven," see note 40 suapra.
48 See EFTA REPORTMR 7 (Nov. 21, 1966).
49
See, e.g., report of the discussions at the Bergen meetings of May 12-13, 1966 in
id. at I (May 23, 1966). For a discussion of the Finn-BEFTA Council, see note 40 supra.
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By analogy to the instant pudding made by simply adding milk
to a flavored powder, this new process has been referred to as "instant international law." There is no more need to be alarmed at
the speed with which new rules can be proclaimed than there is
to be alarmed at the notion of several sets of international rules.
First, as Professor Barkun points out, the increased speed of communication which permits such instant formulation has come to us
at a time when we are better able to use that speed to supplement
the decision-making process with far more data about technical
facts, e.g., was the United Kingdom facing an economic emergency,
and social attitudes, e.g., was continued EFTA and GATT cooperation of overriding importance for all concerned, than had ever
been possible in 1892.
Second, like the possibility of plural sets of international rules,
the possibility of swift consensuses in communities of states is not
new. For example, the Vienna Powers, acting in congress, were
able to agree in their Act of June 9, 1815, that the securing of
civic tights for Jews in the new German Confederation was a matter of international, not just local, concern. " It was not the speed
with which this decision was reached, but the speed with which the
habit of acting in concert vanished that is of concern here. Indeed,
the collective consultation and action of the Vienna powers broke
down at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818 when a parliamentary British government could not publicly subscribe to the keystone principle of
this International Law Vienna, namely, that successor kings must
be consistently confirmed and kept in their dominions at home and
overseas by collective armed force.5 '
Third, more instant law and more sets of norms or rules go
50

See ScHwELB, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMiuNiTY 15

(1964).
51

The British position at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818 remains remarkably relevant to
the 'several international laws' question of 1967 and 1992:
The idea of an "Alliance Solitdaire" by which each State shall be bound to
support the state of a succession government, and possession within all other
States from violence and attack, upon condition of receiving for itself a similar
guarantee, must be understood as morally implying the previous establishment

of such a system of general government as may secure and enforce upon all
kings and nations an internal system of peace and justice. Till the mode of

constructing such a system shall be devised nothing would be more immoral
or prejudicial to the character of government generally than the idea that
their force was collectively to be prostituted to the support of established
power without any consideration of the extent to which it was abused. WBBsr'E, Tim CONGRESS o1'VINNA 1814-1815, at 171 (5th ed. 1950).
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hand in hand. A world of foreign ministers constantly meeting in
several organizations permits groups of nations which are ready to
act upon special norms they have come to (or are willing to) share
to live by those rules without waiting for any broader consensus.
An excellent illustration of this is in the human rights area which
concerned the Vienna powers a century and a half ago. In the more
recent example of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights, discussed by Edward Wise, fifteen Western European nations were willing to subscribe to norms of behavior which
governments must follow in dealing with their own citizens.
Further, they were able to agree on rules so detailed as to preclude
socialist states from joining them, at least as long as they adhere to
present Eastern European practices.
For example, the right to be informed upon arrest of the charges
against you is now deemed part of the common minimum standard
for almost all Western Europeans." The fact that, of the signers
the French government alone refused to ratify this convention may
speak volumes about its readiness, or lack of it, to accept the norms
of that community, or what we might call International Law wn.
In this case, the non-Frenchman in Western Europe gains something quite tangible from both the instant law of the convention
and the fact that a special set of communal norms about how governments must treat their own people can be created and enforced
without waiting for unanimity to develop throughout the continent,
let alone the whole world.
It is this obvious advantage of plurality that has led Professor
Wise in his "Steps Toward the Advancement of Human Rights" to
predict expansion of regional schemes for human rights enforcement. Neither this nor Professor Barkun's predictions of plural
systems of less-than-universally shared values rules out the simultaneous development of planet-wide values. Indeed, we can expect
by 1992 both increased codification of universally held world rules,
such as rules on peaceful use of outer space - what we might call
International Law u - and increased developments on the regional
level, such as the following possible sub-groups of rules: (1) the
52

Compare the broad consensus expressed by the Committee on Criminal Law of

the Congress of Athens in 1955 in its "Fundamental Principles of Penal aw," Resolution I, principle 1(a):

Every accused must have at least the right: (a) to be immediately informed,
on all points and in a language comprehensible to him, of the nature and the
grounds of the charge brought against him. INTRNATIONAL LAW COmMISSION, TnE RULE oF LAw AND HUmAN RiGHTS 23 (1966).
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European human rights area; (2) the Latin American human rights
area; (3) the South Asian human rights area; (4) the French African human rights area; (5) the English African human rights area;
(6) the East European human rights area; (7) the China trade and
rights area; (8) the European free trade and market area; and
(9) the OECD liberalization and rights area.
E.

The Growth of Global Problems and Solutions

It is obvious that some areas for rule-making properly belong
to the universal level rather than to the regional ones. In this category are rules for the peaceful use of Antarctica, or those for nudear development. What may not seem so obvious at the moment
is that, by 1992, many seemingly regional problems, such as fisheries management, will be global ones, if they have not indeed already become so. For example, if by 1992 only the top fifteen
fishing nations of today come to possess fleets able to fish anywhere
in the world, we can expect to see, in the fishing grounds of the
Indian Ocean, the Humboldt Current off Chile-Ecuador-Peru, the
Gulf Stream, the Newfoundland Grand Banks, the Kuroshio Current off Japan, the Alaskan Current, and the North Sea, competing
ships from every single region.5 ' The consequence for international law is easily deduced: global exploitation will require global
regulation.
Like the problem of regulating fishing, if there are to be fish
populations around to be caught in 1992, better technology for
presently developing nations plus greater mobility will mean not
only more frequent contacts with the established nations but also
wider ones, calling in turn for universal rules in many areas subject
today merely to national or regional codes. For example, some
aspects of world trade, such as the terminology used by customs
officials which currently exhibits a dash between United States
pigeonholing and that of Brussels Rules states, may have reached
53
The fifteen top fishing nations are: Peru, China (mainland), Japan, Soviet Union,
United States, Norway, India, South Africa and Southwest Africa, Canada, Spain, Chile,

Denmark, United Kingdom, Iceland, and Indonesia. For the legal implications of futore developments in fishing techniques, see generally Wilkes, The Uses of Resources
Without Conflict and New Rules for InternationalLaw - Myths About the Width of
the TerritorialSea, 42 WASH. L. REv. (1967) (forthcoming). For the twenty-one nations landing annual catches over 500,000 tons in 1965, see 28 COMMERCIAL FISHEMES
REV. 55-56 (Jan. 1966). Much of the credit for current efforts to forge a modem law
of the oceans belongs to Professor Myres McDougal of the Yale Law School who has
consistently warned against inherited "mischievous concepts" in this area based upon
"irrational geographical compartmentalizations."
See, e.g., McDougal, Foward to
JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHEIBS at vii (1965).
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the point where our smaller world appreciates the value of a consistent trade rule anywhere you buy or sell on the planet.
This is indeed one possible development foreseen by trade law
specialist Robert Goldscheider in "Encouraging the Flow of Goods
and Know-How Among Nations - The Role of Industrial Property Rights and Antitrust Laws." Mr. Goldscheider traces three
trends toward the growth of global solutions in this field. First, he
points in the trademark area to the roots of a universally accepted
mark in the 1883 Paris Union, since grown to cover seventy-six
nations. Second, he points to the effectiveness of patent safeguards
in the regional reconstruction which followed World War II, thus

providing historical experiences to support movements for a Europewide or world-wide patent by 1992. Third, he points to the dash
developing between industrial property protection and antitrust policies, the question being whether the use of universal trademarks
and patents may tend to stop trade at national borders. Here, Mr.
Goldscheider's spotlight on the growing acceptance around the
world of the value which enforceable antitrust rules can hold for

a planet of consumers may well have pinpointed one of the major
new areas for global rules in 1992.
Just as a single rule for trade anywhere on the planet can reduce frictions in business, so too in conduct among nations, some
of the frictions which might lead to armed clashes can be reduced
by gradually adding to the body of universal or world rules. Indeed, under the United Nations Charter, the work of the erudite
and respected jurists on the International Law Commission to codify this International Lawu has been proceeding slowly; however,
in 1967 one can report that the Commission's work, especially in
the area of the law of treaties, has reached a much faster pace.
Therefore it is reasonable to expect that by 1992 the body of codified world rules will cover not only treaty law but also, this editor
would hazard to guess, such new areas as any of the following: (1)
duties when alleged Arms Control violators are found in a host
state; (2) functional sources of international law; (3) conditions
for recognition of revolutionary governments; (4) succession to
treaty rights and duties where the system of government is radically
changed; (5) resolving disputes in joint ventures to exploit resources
where one party spurns methods already agreed upon; (6) rules of
evidence before international tribunals; (7) overflight by satellites,
meteorological devices, space stations, high-altitude planes, passenger or freight rockets, especially when landing or return orbits are
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involved; or (8) obligations to consult informally before launching

a protest, a refusal to perform, or a retaliation, based on another
state's alleged breaking of world law.
F.

FindingFacts as a Way To Halt Resort to Force

The biggest mistake one could make in looking at this world
of 1992 would be to assume that greater agreement on local and
global rules will cut out most disputes. Because our Century began in 1892, many, if not most, of the rules involved in international disputes were never themselves contested by the parties.
What has been most frequently the source of friction has been some
difference in the views parties have taken of the facts to which those
rules should be applied.
A prime example of this in 1967 recurs in the periodic flareups
over the status of Berlin. The legal principles involved are common to all sides, as a survey of but a few of them will show. First,
it is agreed that a treaty should be performed according to its terms;
international lawyers have known this under the rubric of pacta
sunt servanda.
Second, no state contests that the four-power agreements for
Allied control of Berlin were binding pacts within the meaning of
that doctrine. It is worth noting that this in itself reflects a major
change between the world of 1892 and that of today. In the older
one, most agreements between states were reduced to a treaty with
all the delay which formal ratification entailed. In 1967, however,
there are so many things concerning which some of the over 130
governments must reach agreement that it is not defeasible to wait,
for instance, the almost three years it took to ratify the consular
treaty of June 1, 1964, between the United States and the Soviet
Union.' Among the hundreds of executive agreements which the
United States government makes each year, aside from the notable
migratory bird agreement with Canada held binding on all of the
states in Missouri v. Holland,55 there are agreements on: airline
landing and pickup rights, investment guarantees, trade fairs, nudear laboratories, cultural exchanges, Peace Corps volunteers in
fifty-three countries," tariff reductions, East-West trade, aid missions, scientific rockets, and the like.
54 See N.Y. Times, March 17, 1967, p. 1, col. 1; N.Y. Times, April 1, 1967, p. 1,
col. 2 & p. 11, col. 1.
55252 U.S. 416 (1920).
56
As of August 1967, per President Johnson's letter transmitting the Fifth Annual
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Third, no state in the Berlin affair disagrees that, under certain
circumstances, the failure by one party to live up to its treaty obligations excuses the other parties from performing. Lawyers think
of this in contract law in terms of "excuse for nonperformance"
following a "material breach." The international law rules appear
to be quite similar with the exception of one possible refinement: at
various times, states have argued that when the basic facts upon
which a treaty was predicated have significantly changed, the treaty
itself is no longer valid - this doctrine has gone under the rubric
of rebus sic stantibus. For example, without expressly adhering to
this doctrine at all, the Soviet Union has in fact adopted both approaches in the Berlin affair. It has alternatively argued that the
right of air access to Berlin granted under an Allied Control Council agreement of November 30, 1945, is void either because the
United States, France, and the United Kingdom abused these rights
or because with the breakdown of four-power unanimity, the supposition underlying the original arrangement fell by the wayside."
Since the United States has also used these principles of nonperformance and'rebus sic stantibus in international disputes, the
legal dispute over Berlin's status actually turns upon factual questions such as these: Who breached first? Was the breach material
in an exculpatory sense? Was the fact of four-power unanimity
really assumed to be the keystone for continuance of the 1945 agreements? Has the factual situation in the 1960's become so changed
that these arrangements can no longer be binding at all? In this
respect, the Berlin affair is far more representative of the international disputes to be expected in 1992 than, say, the Oscar Chinn
Case in which the World Court was asked, inter alia, to interpret
the "freedom of trade" clause of the Convention of St. Germain of
1919 regarding rights of access along the Congo River."
In short, as more rules are set down for all countries, we can
predict that more disputes among them in 1992 will concern not
what the world law is but what the facts of the case at hand are.
Report of the Peace Corps to Congress on March 6, 1967, the sixteen thousand volun-

teers in fifty-three countries were to be increased to nineteen thousand in sixty countries

by August 1968. 56 DBP'T STATE BULL. 529 (1967).
57
See "Text of U.S. Note to Moscow on the Air Corridors to Berlin" of September 8,
1961 in N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1961, p. 2, cols. 2-6, and "Text of Soviet Rejection" of
August 18, 1961 in N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1961, p. 2, cols. 7-8; ct. one excuse advanced
for closing the East Berlin border and raising the "Berlin Wall" in the period from August 13, 1961, to October 1961 was that crossing rights were used for espionage purposes. N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1961, p. 1, col. 8.
58
Oscar Chinn Case, [1934] P.C.IJ., ser. A/B, No. 63.
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For this reason, one of the most vital areas in the quarter-century
from 1968 to 1992 will be the one tackled by Thomas M. Franck,
Director of the Center of International Studies at New York University, together with Laurence D. Cherkis, an Editorial Associate
at the Center, in "The Problem of Impartial Fact-Finding in International Disputes."
Using Viet-Nam and the Dominican Republic incident as
graphic illustrations, contributors Franck and Cherkis paint a picture of the world of today as one in which (1) there may be differences between government and private reporting of crucial events
to which international rules are to be applied; and (2) those differences may stem, not from deliberate distortion, but rather from a
"profusion of witness" which is coupled with the absence of a credible system for finding facts. The important thing about the factual issues cited - such as where the supplies and direction for the
Viet Cong come from - is not so much which "witness" is correct
as it is that the 1967 world is still in the process of developing a
means for getting "credible" findings of fact to be used in resolving
international disputes; a function which partisan sources cannot
serve.
This is not to say that impartial finders of fact are new to world
law. The authors have surveyed five methods which are in use today, namely, fact-finding by: (1) ad hoc missions of the United
Nations, such as those to Malaysia, Oman, and Viet-Nam; (2) trusteeship Council missions, and those of the "Committee of TwentyFour," as when the latter was asked to look at charges of racial discrimination and political suppression in Spanish Equatorial Guinea;
(3) missions from regional organizations; (4) non-governmental
organizations, such as .the Anti-Slavery Society which reported on
slave marketing in Saudi Arabia, or the International Commission
of Jurists' mission to look into charges of "armed aggression," "flagripping," "unwarranted shootings," and "job discrimination" in the
Canal Zone Incident;" ° and (5) national commissions, from the
royal commission system to the President's Commission on -the Assassination of President Kennedy. While the "cooling off" aspects
59 The impartial fact-finding in the Canal Zone in 1964 by three highly respected
members of the International Commission of Jurists was of key importance in permitting Panama and the United States to back off from the confrontation cycle begun by
shots during a demonstration; they found that (1) the limited firing of the United States
soldiers, while fatally injuring several Panamanians, was by no stretch of the imagination armed aggression, although neither was it a use of force warranted by the actual
situation; and (2) the felt grievance of the Panamanians from alleged job discrimina-

tion was supported by the facts.
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of turning a problem over to third parties for investigation, which
breaks the confrontation cycle of 1892, are expressly not the subject of this particular study, they do recur in it, as in the effect of
the United Nations Mission on subsequent tensions between Malaysia and Indonesia, or in the effect of the Organization of African
Unity's commission on threatened armed dashes over the Moroccan-Algerian border.
The most important contribution of this survey, however, is in
the great number of fresh insights it provides into what makes one
impartial finding of fact more credible than another - perhaps the
most crudal communication problem in world law today. The
authors of this study have thus posed the problem of the next quarter-century in terms of a research proposal which would take these
insights and test them, either to provide support for them as guiding principles in the practice of world law6" or to discard any one
of their hypotheses if it should prove insupportable.
Just how great a difference having a fact-finding mission's report accepted throughout the world could make in 1992 world
affairs can be seen by taking hypothetical disputes and applying
some devices which might follow from each of the hypotheses.
Suppose that in 1992 - a year when any party to the Antarctic
Treaty can propose an amendment which, if rejected, can permit
it to withdraw - the Chinese People's Republic, a fledgling party
to that Treaty, accuses the United States of using its nuclear reactors in Antarctica to refuel the U.S.S. Daniel Boone, a submarine
armed with Polaris IX missiles, in what is alleged to be "a most
flagrant violation of the Treaty going to the core of trust in peaceful intentions on which the whole Treaty rests" and threatens to
airlift two divisions of troops into Antarctica to "provide a safer
regime to ensure peaceful use of the Antarctic islands." The State
Department issues a release calling the charges "groundless, except
that the U.S.S. Daniel Boone entered in distress and was helped to
repair its propeller by a scientist from the Central American
Union."
As developed from the hypotheses of Messrs. Franck and Cherkis, either the Antarctic Treaty Powers or the Security Council
would, in addition to any precautionary measures taken, seek a
mission of impartial men and women to get at the facts. The
choice of the type of mission, its scope, its procedures, and its composition would take into account research done between 1968 and
1992 on the effectiveness of various kinds of fact-finding missions.
00 Compare a similarly valuable study of principles for negotiation proposed by
former ambassador, now Professor, Arthur Lall of Columbia University in LALL, MODERN INTEBNATIONAL NEGOTIATION (1966).
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This research would have included, first, studies of changes in attitude brought about by alternative kinds of missions, such as the degree to which certain attitudes of the people in one state toward
another state's intentions or motives were altered - as evidenced,
inter alia, in the editorial positions taken by national journals. Second, it would have included historical and psychological studies on
the strength of the correlation between various fact-finding methods
and changes in behavior, which reflect the degree to which those
facts were accepted. Third, studies would have been undertaken
which compared similar situations in one of which a particular way
of finding facts was used that was not utilized in the other.
What we could expect to discover happening in the hypothetical might be the following. First, the Security Council might reject the temptation to be the body to appoint finders of fact here if
the presence of one or more of the disputing parties on that Council
might weaken from the start the faith of some party in the appointing authority. Perhaps the Secretary-General would pick men
whose professional and popular esteem augurs best for widespread
acceptance of their report. This team in turn would set up a means
of taking testimony, preferably in Antarctica at some point, aimed
at hearing all major witnesses. 1 The team would also hear both
the United States and the Chinese People's Republic in open sessions, allow summaries, and permit counsel from both sides to rebut
testimony and to cross-examine. The team might begin by informally securing assurances that the disputants would not attempt to
guide its inquiries or make public statements likely to commit themselves irretrievably to an inflexible view of the facts. Finally, the
team will attempt in its final report to reflect its thoroughness, including its findings on essential subsidiary facts, its logic and its
knowledgeable approach with the greatest unanimity on findings
that can be reached under the circumstances. Such a process of impartial finding of fact will be expensive, as indeed was the Warren
Commission whose findings on the assassination of President Kennedy are evaluated as to credibility by our authors. But courses of
action like wars, peace forces, police actions, or mobilizations are
extremely expensive alternatives to findings of fact backed by maximum chances of credibility, something needed most in the very situations in which resort to force of arms most threatens to occur.
The credibility of facts found is a pivotal factor in the fashion61 Query: Does such a need for completeness in the investigation point also to a

need for some limited international subpoena process by 1992?
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ing of an ordered world. Indeed, one might speak of it as the
problem of the "authority" of fact-finding, for facts found by means
that foster credence in them possess an authority very much akin
to, and often even greater than, that which we ascribe to national
and international bodies.
Messrs. Franck and Cherkis make what is perhaps the most
dramatic demonstration of this when they compare the widespread
acceptance, despite individual critical attacks, of the findings in the
report on the assassination of President Kennedy with the absence
of like world-wide acceptance of officially found facts which would
support a given legal position of the United States in the Viet-Nam
incidents. The question raised is whether this disparity reflects the
use of impartial, exhaustive, scholarly, and prestigious finders of
fact in the study made by the Warren Commission.
It is easy to dismiss the difference as reflecting desires to discredit the United States government for its presence or conduct in
Viet-Nam. It is just as easy, however, to ascribe this difference to
emotional revulsion at reports that a government with a 190-year
history of defending liberty, engages in "kill counts" and "strafing
and bombing techniques which do not avoid unwarranted maiming
of civilians." Yet, suppose we assume that the official presentation of the facts is the accurate one, and that most of the international law positions based on those facts are thus factually supportable, the failure of South Viet-Nam and its allies to refer disputed
questions to less partisan fact-finders is, nevertheless, fatal to the
breadth of .the authority of the facts officially reported. One has
only to pick up any newspaper outside the United States to see the
compelling need for more authoritative findings - as could readily
be provided, for instance, by a requested report from the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva on detailed questions
about military conduct, plus one from a royal commission on the
political facts - if the allies' position is to receive more widespread
support
The problem is not the absence of findings, for there is a plethora of witness, it is that these findings exhibit, evidently, none of
the real authority that comes from impartiality, thoroughness, access, and prestige, in any way dose to that of the Warren Commission's report. The added tragedy - to the extent that the world
of 1950 to 1967 has been a bipolar one and to some lesser extent
the world of 1968 to 1992 may remain one - is that continued
stability depends in part on the authority of official representations
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which must, from time to time, be buttressed by impartial corroboration from without.
G. The Rise of TransnationalMan
Another clearly visible change between 1892 and 1967 has
been the growth of a class of persons whose work, business, scholarship, or humanitarian activities puts them down in another country
for some period of time. Three new characteristics have emerged
as this group has grown in number by leaps and bounds.
First, it is no longer a class predominantly made up of the very
wealthy. Here are to be found a Dutch electrical engineer working
on a powerhouse in Iran; a Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) 2 fisheries expert from Taiwan advising farmers in Louisiana on fish stocks for rice paddies; a Saudi Arabian driller manning
an oil rig on the continental shelf off Malaysia; a teacher of Spanish
from Mexico City spending a year in Spain to work on her book; a
French architect supervising a public housing project in Quebec;
a salaried executive from a Japanese electronics firm manning its
new factory in Ireland; or a young lawyer from San Francisco doing

drafting work for an understaffed ministry in East Africa. These,
not the playboys of the western world, will be the men filling sixhundred-seat hypersonic planes travelling at five thousand miles

per hour by 1992.63
.Second, many in this class are now in occupations which will
keep them moving about the world for much of their productive
lives. Here are to be found the Canadian construction foreman
specializing in huge dams; the biologist from Kerala specializing in
regeneration research; the transportation specialist from Australia
listed on the United Nations roll of 300,000 civilians willing to
staff government posts abroad, called "OPEX"; the German industrial engineer in the foreign operations division of a world-wide
firm; or the Cleveland attorney advising on international licensing
agreements.
Third, members of this class move about a world which is their
environment; they expect to be asked to live by the laws of the
host country; and, in return, they expect those laws to be reason62

A United Nations organization having 111 members. See also note 34 supra.

63The six-hundred-passenger planes are already under contract for delivery in the

1970's; the first high-altitude scramjet engine, designed ultimately to provide passenger
plane speeds of 5,000 m.p.h. and military speeds of 8,000 m.p.h., has already been
tested. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1967, p. 3, col. 1. The term "hypersonie' is used for
speeds over five times the speed of sound, or roughly 3,300 m.p.h. at high altitudes. Ibid.
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able. What will be 'reasonable" in this context is not an exact sum
of expectations brought from previous countries and jobs; it is, however, something more than those reduced expectations which historical accident may have created in a given spot A Frenchman
might be ready, for instance, to adjust to the notion of an American
criminal hearing at which, not the judge but the prosecutor questions the witness, yet he would be horrified to learn that in some
states his attorney cannot see that prosecutor's dossier against him.
In 1892, the analogous posts may have been held by colonial
civil servants who remained within the cultural expectations of
their mother countries. In 1967, this has become a much less common phenomenon as colony after colony has gained its independence. By 1992, this "trans-national man" will be operating entirely in non-colonial territories. Thus, he will need to have some
minimum floor of human rights which he may expect to have
honored in his relations with officials and policemen. To the extent, too, that his business itself is trans-national, he will seek to
have more common rules for doing business plus more general regulations to tell him what he may or may not do. These expectations
will add to rising domestic pressures for more widespread rules in
these two areas.
H. Creating Liberty Under Law
Each of the three contributors who deal with human rights
stresses the pivotal era entered in 1967. World law has reached a
juncture at which it has been firmly established that the individual
can be a subject of international law." Robert Bloom, Secretary
of the International Criminal Law Commission of the World Peace
Through Law Center, demonstrates that holding individuals responsible for violations of international law and giving them redress if
it is violated go hand in hand. In "Steps To Define Offenses
-r.Bloom explains that the attenAgainst the Law of Nations,"
tion focused upon the individual by the growth from 1892 to
1917 of state responsibility for the treatment of aliens in turn supported an expansion of criminal responsibility for individuals, such
as war criminals, who violate community law.
64 See generally the comprehensive data collected in GORMLE, TiM PROC3DURAL
ATIONAL AND SUPRANATIONAL TRISTATUS OF THEB INDvIIDUAL BEFORE IN
BUNALS (1966); cf. the ease with which the right of individual petition was accorded
those in trusteeship territories by the drafters of the United Nations Charter, discussed
in Huston, Human Rights Issues of the United Nations Conference on International
Organizations,IOWA L REV., June 1967 (forthcoming).
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Where will this consciousness of international individual liberty take us by 1992? Mr. Bloom points to several predictable
trends that will shape that era. First, the number of international
offenses will itself be increased. Just as genocide has been added
to piracy, slave trade, narcotics traffic, forced labor, and traffic in
women, so too one can anticipate some existing areas of international crime to be more precisely spelled out, as, perhaps, in the
area of war crimes. Second, following Mr. Bloom's prediction of
new types of offenses, we may look for international criminal responsibility in fields of law not yet touched. This may be through
some universal need related to world survival, as in the case of individuals who violate arms control agreements. On the other hand,
this may be through some felt regional need to have business practices held to a common standard, as in the case of trans-national
monopolists.
The world of 1967 already has, as Mr. Goldscheider points out,
the international antitrust law of the Common Market. Under its
rules, a French businessman may be fined one million dollars for
an agreement with his Swiss competitor to divide up French and
German markets. Further, in the period from 1968 to 1992 we
can also expect, so long as some of the "Outer Seven" are not joined
with the "Six," greater implementation of EFTA commitments to
eliminate harmful restrictive practices. " Finally, we can expect to
see, as the integration foreseen by Mr. Landau among the developing states proceeds, other regional authorities turning to unjust restraints in their areas. It is far from unreasonable to expect, therefore, that in the world of 1992 there will be many regional codes
of unlawful business behavior and possibly even a single worldwide set of offenses which are so outrageous as to be universally
condemned, e.g., selling below cost with the intent and effect of
driving another out of business.
The economic "rights" of Enterprise A to compete with Enterprise B on fair terms are increasingly safeguarded today, not because most governments are in the hands of business interests, but
because consumers pay less for better goods on the whole when A
and B can strive equally for their custom. This strong concern with
obtaining the greatest happiness for the greatest number, as Jeremy
6

5Every state in EFTA has had, since January 1965, some form of law against monopolistic practices. See LAMBRINIDIs, THE STRUCTURE, FUNCTioN AND LAW OF A
FREE TRADE AREA 127 n.42 (1965); permanent EFTA-wide restrictive practices rules
are intended to follow an experimental period. Id. at 122. For a discussion of the
"Outer Seven," see note 40 supra. For a discussion of the "Six," see note 41 supra.
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Bentham put it in the nineteenth century, 6 is at the heart of
changes since 1892 to keep both business and government from
proceeding without restraint at the expense of the man in the street,
as Professor Wise points out in "Steps Toward The Advancement
of Human Rights."
In tracing the shifts in international protection that have taken
place, Professor Wise perceptively reviews the 1892-to-1917 period
and shows that the nineteenth century already had "a cautious but
conscious program of reform" in human rights. The program embraces, first, treaty guarantees, such as the guarantee of tolerance
for religious minorities found in "every major peace treaty"; second,
diplomatic protection, already linked, as Professor Wise points out,
to acceptance of the idea that there were "ordinary standards of
civilization" open to any international tribunal to apply; and, third,
humanitarian intervention, which likewise assumed that gross
abuses of such standards were "self-evident."
Professor Wise also finds much to explain the United Nations'
commitments to human rights today in such earlier contributions
as: the International Labour Organization's work since the Berne
Conference of 1906; Leonard Woolf's International Government
published in 1916; and the Declaration of the International Rights
of Man of 1929. All three accepted as a premise the notion of
international human rights; all three accepted as a goal that they
should be codified and ultimately become enforceable; and all three
saw a large role in this process for the international organization,
whether public or private.
This then is the role that we can see carried to some intermediate fruition by 1992, if, as Professor Wise warns, we do not permit
the present need to emphasize racial inequality to divert us from
the longer-ranged problem of ranking human rights values so as
to give priority to procedural protection for individuals.
L

Regional Integration:A Way Owt of the
Development Dilemma?

The Brazilian jurist Georges Landau makes a significant contribution with his analysis of the plight of the developing regions,
as exemplified in Latin America. His summary of accusations common in his region is as valuable for what it tells us about the picture in 1992 if integration does not become an accomplished fact,
6
The philosophical concept is known as hedonism and is discussed in relation to
morals and legislation in THE WORKs O1 JmunY BENTHAM 17 (Burton ed. 1843).
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as it is for what it says about foreseeable attitudes in what SecretaryGeneral U Thant has called the rift between the "have-noe' nations
of the southern hemisphere and the "haves" of the northern one.
First, the feeling of powerlessness before world giants will become deeper if the gap between industrial and less-advanced economies continues to widen. Second, the African links with the European communities restored industrially by the Marshall Plan will
be further strengthened at the expense of continued tariff handicaps
for goods from Latin American states left in isolated bargaining
positions. Third, mining of deposits under the continental shelves
and new plantings in the arid or untouched lands of other continents could lead to lower per capita revenues from exports of raw
materials. Fourth, the terms of trade could remain over-weighted
in favor of countries buying these raw materials and selling back
higher-priced industrial goods, thus continuing recurrent economic
crises.
If to raise this specter is in some way to speed present commitments toward integration, Mr. Landau's warning may well be
heeded before 1992. He has framed his study both in terms of
the problems of past gaps between ideals and achievements and in
terms of the existing institutions from which something more positive may emerge. Perhaps most significant of all are Mr. Landaus
reasons for believing that once the basic commitment to integration
is matched by the will to achieve it, Latin America and, one might
hypothesize, analogous developing regions, may be in an even better position in some respects than were the six Common Market
countries of Europe in 1957.
J. An Alternative World for 1992
In the same prophetic character as was George Orwell's 1984
is Aaron Danzig's "Meeting Demands for Action as a Community
of Nations." Here we find an assessment of the League of Nations'
failures and the United Nations' beginnings in three major categories: peace-keeping, aid, and human rights. If we assess the point
we have reached in 1967 honestly, says Mr. Danzig, we have to
admit the following. First, United Nations peace-keeping "hit its
all-time high in 1956" in the Suez crisis and has since been hamstrung in effectiveness by its members' inability to reach unanimous
agreement on reliable methods for financing future operations.
Second, we must face up to the fact that national programs, like
United States bilateral aid, still run up to 4.5 billion dollars a year,
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while the United Nations' own budgets remain at approximately
200 million dollars a year. Third, we have yet to see whether
United Nations sanctions will work to make human rights meaningful in Rhodesia or South Africa and how many states will ratify
the implementing protocol to the new International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights. Further, warns Mr. Danzig, even at
the small rate of annual increase for per capita income set for the
United Nations Development Decade in 1960 - five percent, and
even this has not been uniformly achieved - this means that for
the fifty percent of the globe with a per capita income under one
hundred dollars a year, there is little hope in sight. "What gaineth
a man," Mr. Danzig asks, "if he earns 100 dollars per annum in
1960 and 150 dollars per annum by 1970?", or, one might add,
248 dollars per annum by 1992?
No less compelling a warning is contained in the "Prologue"
by Sir Percy Spender, Past President of the World Court. Like
Messrs. Landau and Danzig, he too asserts that the machinery to
avoid the chaos of a world that achieves too little too late by 1992
is now at hand. After nine years on the International Court of Justice, Sir Percy concludes that there is no dispute that cannot be handled by impartial third-party adjudication as a more satisfactory alternative to the armed conflicts foreseen by Mr. Danzig if no major
improvements are made.
Projecting from Sir Percy's confidence in the role that thirdparty adjudication and the rule of law can play in the world of
1992, if governments will but let them become routine, one could
visualize by that time an era in which confrontation cycles never
reached the stage of resort to force of arms. In such a world, too,
the mere threat of force would be no more normal between nations
party to a dispute than itis between citizens in contract cases today.
The only major precondition for such a world, and one deemed by
Sir Percy to be lacking today, is the widespread political will to
change past and present patterns that bar the effective rule of law.
K.

The China Gap in World Law

The problem in the twenty-five years ahead is further complicated by the enormity of what might be called "the China Gap."
There is nothing new about the fact that much of mainland China
has remained, for all but a brief period, outside the mainstream of
international law developments. In the nineteenth century, the
Imperial Court sent several groups of students to Europe and the
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United States but these groups were all small, carefully guarded
against Western manners, and, where possible, isolated from the
main citizenry of the host country. The course of study was limited
to language, technology, arms manufacture, and military or naval
science. These few hundred students were deemed failures and
were recalled in 1881; only two of those in the United States had
by that time finished college. As narrow and small as these attempts were to raise officials who would be trained in methods used
outside China in that century, they were ultimately deemed unuseful, perhaps because the children chosen to go before 1898 were
only ten to sixteen years old, and also perhaps because the antipathy
towards foreign ways at court had become too deeply engrained over
the centuries."7
In the years from 1902 to 1942, some 100,000 students, who
later made up more than half of the prominent men in the Republic of China, studied abroad."8 In part because of this, some of the
most perceptive contributions in world law, at the United Nations
Charter conference in 1945 and in the work of various international organizations since, have been made by delegates from that
government.
The China Gap was restored, however, by events on the mainland since 1950. The group which studied non-technical subjects
outside China is insignificant in voice and impact today. 9 The
tragedy this represents for world law is reflected in the reported
rejoinder received by a high official from a country outside China
during negotiations with his equally highly-placed mainland Chinese counterpart: "International law, what's that?"
The dilemma is that conduct by mainland China, military, verbal, and otherwise, tends to increase the chances that China and its
500 to 900 million people will remain outside the mainstream of
world law, precisely during the quarter-century when its technical
67

See WANG, CHiNsE INTELLECTUALs AND THE WEST 1872-1949, at 42-51
(1960). For the extent of continuity in orientation and in political institutions in
China, see Wilkes, "A Comparison of Political Structures Between Taoist and Maoist
China" (unpub. paper, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and Int'l Affairs, Princeton
University 1951).
68 See WANG, op. cit. supra note 67, at 177, but note, however, that only a very small
minority of provincial leadership ever came from this group. Id. at 179.
69 John M.H. Lindbeck, Associate Director of the East-Asian Research Center at
Harvard University, reports that the process of destroying this class was consciously and

thoroughly carried out, which may be reflected in the reportedly small number of people
working on foreign relations, low budgetary allocations for foreign affairs, and the

small amount of time devoted to international affairs by governmental bodies.

See

Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Poreign Relations on U.S. Policy With Respect to Mainland China, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 187-88, 196 (1966).
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and military improvements will make it most desirable to have that
state subject to the rule of law of which Sir Percy Spender speaks.
It would be a mistake to believe that the persistent votes keeping the mainland out of the United Nations are responsible for the
China Gap; it is the product of conscious choices by mainland offidais to stay dear of that mainstream. In short, had the recent vote
on expelling representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the United
Nations and recognizing the People's Republic as the only lawful
China - which failed by a vote of 46 to 57 with 17 abstaining"
gone overwhelmingly the other way, we would now have a Chinese delegation in the General Assembly, but we would still have
the China Gap - a gulf between world law acceptances that have
taken place in the rest of the world over three centuries, and the
vacuum with respect to that law deliberately preserved in Imperial
and Maoist China. That gap must eventually be bridged, perhaps
before 1992, by means and at a time one cannot now foresee.
L.

The AcceleratingPace of Change in World Law

One thing is dear: if there is to be an adequate response in the
world law area, it will have to be a more sober and a faster one.
The historical surveys of the contributors show the considerable
distances traveled in each topic since 1892. They show, too, the
choices already made and the organizations already developed that
make the world law of 1967 so different from that at the start of
our Century. What these contributions do not, and cannot, do is
tell us precisely what will happen by 1992. The most accurate
prediction that can be made about the quarter-century from 1968
on is that world law will continue to change at a faster pace than
ever before.
This prediction is based on several facts. First, by 1992 satellite communications will link all countries which elect to use them.
Under present plans, by the end of 1969 more than fifty nations
will be linked through forty "earth stations" by the INTELSAT
system of communications satellites."1 Second, the last seventeen
years have already shown expansions in the subject matter of world
70 55 DEP'T STATE BULL. 929 n.4 (1966).
71 Speech of John A. Johnson, Vice President-International of the Communications
Satellite Corporation, in the symposium on "Science Challenges the Law" at Western
Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio, April 14, 1967. The name "earth station" itself
is representative of the ways in which scientists become oriented toward planet-wide

problems and research before international law catches up with the implications of new
technology.
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law more far-reaching than the changes during the entire one hundred years prior to 1917. An examination of Table II, which contrasts the new topics taught in courses in International Law today
with the entire range of topics covered in 1917, vividly illustrates
this point:
TABLE H

Comparison of All Topics Taught in the First Quarter-Century
72
With Added Topics Taught Today
1892-1917
Nature and Authority
of International Law
Persons in International Law:
States, Protectorates,
Belligerent or Insurgent
Communities
Continuing Personality of
States
Jurisdiction
Acquisition and Transfer of
Jurisdiction by Discovery
and Occupation, Prescription, Cession, or Conquest
Effects of Transfer
Pacific Relations:
Treaties, and Extradition
Non-Belligerent Settlement
of Controversies:
Arbtiration, Reprisals,
and Embargo

1967
Arms Competition and the Idea of Stable
Deterrence
The Individual as a Subject of International
Law

Unlawfulness of the Use of Force
Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests
Outer Space:
Communications and Surveillance
Satellites and Spacecraft
Arctic Areas
Extrahazardous Activities
Capacity of the United Nations To
Administer Territory
Genocide
Conservation of the Living Resources of
the High Seas
World Economic Development
Air Space
Financing the United Nations
Human Rights
Peace-Keeping by The United Nations
Security During Disarmament
The Secretariat
Toward a Rule of Law Community
Membership in The United Nations
Access to Resources: Peaceful Uses of
Atomic Energy

72
Topics from the 1892-1917 period come from EvANs, LEADING CASES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (1917); these topics are also included in contemporary texts in diverse but far different proportions, as can be seen from Evans' greater concern for the
laws of war than for the peacetime aspects of international law - the topics above the
line accounted for 197 pages in a 454 page book and the topics below the line accounted
for the remaining pages. The new topics come from one or more of the following texts
presently used in connection with courses in international law in Australia, Canada,
the United Kingdom, or the United States: BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed.
1962); BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (1966); CASTEL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1965); THE STRATEGY OF WORLD ORDER (Falk & Mendlovitz ed. 1965-1966); O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAw (1965); ORPIELD & RE,
CASES ON INTERNATIONAL LAw (rev. ed. 1965).
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Money in International Law
Immunities of International Organizations
and Their Personnel
War Crimes
Antarctic Treaty
International Administration of Justice
Self-Determination
Work of the International Law Commission
Legal Devices Adopted by Investors and
Hosts for Foreign Capital
International Labour Organization
Control of Narcotics
The Prevention of World War III

The third fact which augurs an accelerated rate of change in
world law is the incorporation of new disciplines - marine biology, psychology, history, the social sciences, and the new communication sciences - into the process of making world law.
Just where this accelerated pace will take international law is
difficult to foresee. The lawyer who turn~s for the first time to the
contemporary problems of international law is amazed to find how
much is going on, how diverse a field it is, and how much the little
glimpse he may have caught from an occasional headline or bar
journal article is like the top of an iceberg whose submerged mass
went as unseen as it may have been unsuspected. International
lawyers attempting to foresee the impact on world law of the contributions that these aforementioned disciplines have yet to make
are faced with a similar iceberg. One can predict that it will be far
greater than is presently suspected, but its contours and ultimate
shape remain to a large degree unfathomable.
M.

Role of the Behavioral Scientist

Michael Barkun, who wrote the study on "Bringing The Insights of Behavioral Science to International Rules," is characteristic of the new breed of scholars who are helping to shape the world
law of the next quarter-century. As a political scientist, he sees the
instabilities of the 1892-to-1917 world as reflections of the basic
ways of thinking about the rule of law which then prevailed. Paradoxically, he finds that the same "crumbling of security, power,
and confidence" that fulminated in World War I provides some of
the grounds for today's greater reliance on demonstrated effectiveness of institutions and hence on the opinions of experts, who often
are neither diplomats nor jurists. Professor Barkun posits, for instance, that international rules will be increasingly related to scien-
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tific facts; one example should prove to be the rules for fishing
discussed earlier.7 8
Professor Barkun suggests that as foreign offices gain greater
knowledge about the domestic political limits on what some states
can do internationally, they may lead world law more rapidly down
the path of non-politicallaws in preference to overstressing attempts
to get agreement on the political ones. How will these "political"
paths be known? Perhaps, as Professor Barkun - drawing on
what political scientists are doing today - hypothesizes, by men
who simulate the making of decisions by others; perhaps by computers utilizing the data of many disciplines from which - on
standards of choice humans have yet to make verbal, let alone to
program - this and similar questions may someday be answered.
78

See text accompanying note 53 suPra.

